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Bharat Tracker

methodology

How these numbers were built, and where they are weak

This page exists because a data site without one is asking to be taken on trust. Read it before quoting anything here.

The core rule

Every number rendered on this site must be traceable to a named source with a URL and a verification date. This is enforced mechanically, not by good intentions: scripts/validate.ts runs before every build and fails it if any series lacks a definition, a unit, a resolvable source, or a confidence grade. A series that cannot satisfy that does not ship.

Gaps stay gaps

Where a figure could not be located, the period is stored as null and the chart shows a break in the line. Nothing is interpolated, smoothed, or back-filled with a plausible estimate. The defence exports series is missing FY2014-15 and FY2015-16 for exactly this reason — those two years are genuinely absent from the primary releases located during verification, and a smooth curve there would be a fabrication.

Confidence grades

Confidence describes the number, not the prestige of the publisher.

High (709 series)
Primary document, unambiguous definition, cross-checked against a second source.
Medium (40 series)
Reliable source, but the definition drifts between releases or the figure is routinely revised.
Low (18 series)
Estimate, single-sourced, or contested methodology. A low-confidence series is required to carry a note explaining the uncertainty — the validator enforces this.

currently graded low

  • Estimated nuclear warhead inventory India publishes nothing about its arsenal. Every figure here is an external estimate inferred from fissile-material production and delivery systems, with an error bar SIPRI itself describes as significant.
  • Defence corridor investment committed Committed is not grounded. Against roughly ₹70,000 crore of commitments across both corridors, grounded investment is about ₹10,855 crore — around 15%.
  • Defence corridor investment grounded This is the number that matters, and the one rarely quoted. Grounded investment runs at roughly 15% of committed.
  • Defence industrial corridors by status Two corridors (UP, Tamil Nadu) are operating with land allotted and units producing. Two more (Maharashtra, Assam) are announced but not established.
  • Defence corridor nodes Node lists are press-sourced. They are stable and uncontested, but no primary notification was located during verification, so this is graded low rather than treated as a record.
  • Direct jobs created in UP defence corridor Reported against a stated potential of 50,000 jobs — actual delivery is around a quarter of that.
  • MoUs signed in UP defence corridor 170 MoUs converted into 57 land allotments — a conversion rate of roughly one in three. Useful as a reality check on announcement-driven reporting.
  • Action Index — left-wing extremism Author-constructed, and measured against the series' own average rather than an absolute bar — a year scores well by beating this conflict's recent record, not a fixed standard. Arrests and surrenders are unevenly reported, so that component is often zero.
  • Tonality Score — left-wing extremism Author-constructed. Every input is published, but the choice of dimensions and neutral points is a judgement — see the methodology page before using this for anything.
  • Action Index — terrorism Author-constructed on the same basis as the left-wing extremism index, and carrying the same caveats.
  • Tonality Score — terrorism Author-constructed on the same basis as the LWE score, and carrying the same caveats.
  • Suicide rate A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled.
  • Suicide rate — men A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled. The gap between men and women is far narrower in India than in most countries, where male rates typically run at two to three times female rates. That narrowness is one of the more consistent findings about Indian suicide and is worth reading the two series against each other for.
  • Suicide rate — women A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled.
  • Suicide rate by age group A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled. WHO publishes the age breakdown for a single year, so this is a profile rather than a trend and must not be read as one.
  • Suicide rate by age group — men A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled. A single year, not a trend.
  • Suicide rate by age group — women A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled. A single year, not a trend. In WHO's published breakdown the youngest band is the one place where the female rate exceeds the male rate, and by a wide margin. India is among a small number of countries where that is true, and it is invisible in any chart that reports both sexes together.
  • Suicide rate, age-standardised A modelled estimate, not a count. WHO models country rates where civil registration is incomplete, and India's is; NCRB publishes India's own recorded suicide figures and they differ substantially from these. This site carries the WHO series because it is comparable across countries and across years, and grades it low confidence because the two sources disagree and neither can settle the other. It is a measure of deaths, not of how common mental illness is — a different question, declared separately and still unfilled. Compare it against the crude rate: where they diverge, the gap is India's changing age structure rather than a change in risk.

Source tiers

Tier 1 is the primary record holder for that quantity — a PIB release, a ministry document, a SIPRI fact sheet. Tier 2 is a credible secondary compiler. Tier 3 is a press report of a primary claim. A series resting only on tier-3 sources cannot be graded above low confidence, and the validator raises this automatically.

Derived charts are labelled

Year-on-year, indexed, growth-rate and share views are computed here from the stored series, and every one says so beneath its title. Derived views are only generated where they are meaningful — a year-on-year chart is never drawn across non-adjacent periods, and an index chart is never drawn off a zero base. Of 4460 charts, 4380 are live on currently-loaded data and 80 await the pipeline backfill; the pending ones are shown with an explicit “awaiting data” state rather than an empty axis.

The two constructed indices

Every other number here reports something somebody else published. The Tonality Score and the Action Index do not. They are constructed on this site, they carry a judgement in their names, and they are graded low confidence for that reason. This section is here so you can decide whether to trust them, or reject them and keep the fatality counts underneath, which stand on their own.

Tonality Score, −100 to +100

A proxy for the state’s posture in a given year. Negative reads accommodative — talks first, threat downplayed. Positive reads decisive — security first, an eradication mandate. Five dimensions, each bounded to ±20:

  1. Initiative — the adversary’s share of combatant deaths.
  2. Civilian protection — inverse of the civilian share of all deaths.
  3. Containment — direction of travel in total violence against the previous year.
  4. Attrition — cadre taken alive by arrest and surrender, as a share of all cadre removed.
  5. Escalation dominance — this year’s exchange ratio against its own three-year baseline.

Action Index, −1.6 to +1.6

A performance measure rather than a posture one. Four components, each bounded to ±0.4 and each measured against the series’ own average: neutralisations and arrests-plus-surrenders push it up, civilian deaths and total incident volume push it down.

Why nothing here is hand-scored

The obvious way to build a “willpower” index is to read the year’s policy documents and code doctrine and framing by judgement. That would track the stated posture more directly — and it would be unfalsifiable, unreproducible and impossible for you to check. So posture is inferred from what the state did, not from what it said: every dimension above is computed from published fatality counts, and you can recompute all of it from the series on this site.

That choice has a cost, and it is the first item below.

What these numbers cannot tell you

  • Posture is inferred from outcomes, not from statements. A government that talks tough while operations stall scores low, and one that talks softly while operations succeed scores high. The name says willpower; the arithmetic reads behaviour.
  • The inputs are compilations, not a register. SATP, MHA parliamentary answers and press tallies disagree by a few per cent on most years and by more on contested incidents. Differences under about 10 points on tonality are inside that noise.
  • 'Neutralised' is the state's count of adversaries killed. Where an encounter is disputed, this index inherits the dispute without resolving it, and a year with contested encounters will read as more decisive than it may have been.
  • Fewer deaths can mean control or it can mean the adversary chose not to fight. The index cannot separate a defeated insurgency from a dormant one.
  • Arrests and surrenders are unevenly reported. Years missing them score zero on attrition rather than being penalised, so those years are measured on four dimensions while others are measured on five.
  • The index says nothing about whether the underlying grievance was addressed, which is the question most of the surrounding argument is actually about.

These are ordinal, not cardinal. A year at +60 is more security-first than one at +30; it is not twice anything. Differences under about 10 points are inside the noise of the underlying compilations.

Known weaknesses

  • Nominal rupees. Indian financial series are stored as published — nominal, not inflation-adjusted. A large share of the apparent growth in defence exports, production and budget is rupee inflation and depreciation. Treat every rupee series as an upper bound on real growth.
  • Definitional drift. Airport counts vary between releases (157, 159, 160, 163) because “operational” sometimes includes heliports and water aerodromes. Highway network length grows partly through re-designation of existing state roads. These are flagged per series.
  • Estimates presented as data. Nuclear warhead counts are external inferences — India publishes nothing. That series is graded low and should be read as order-of-magnitude only.
  • Commitments versus delivery. Investment figures for defence corridors are MoU commitments. Grounded investment runs at roughly 15% of that. Where both exist, both are shown.
  • Schematic map geometry. Corridor lines on the map are straight segments between real geocoded endpoint cities, not surveyed alignments. The opening years are the load-bearing fact; the geometry is indicative.
  • Fiscal versus calendar years. Indian data is mostly fiscal-year (April-March); World Bank data is calendar-year. They are never plotted on a shared axis.

The pipeline

Two connectors run on a schedule. The World Bank connector pulls full 2001-present history for 66 indicators across India and five comparator countries, rewriting each series in full rather than appending — the World Bank revises history, and appending would freeze stale revisions in. The news connector aggregates seven outlets purely as a change-detection signal.

Connectors never throw. A failed connector leaves the previous committed data in place and marks the run partial, so the site keeps serving last-known-good values rather than blanking a chart. Output is written only after validation passes, so a malformed upstream response cannot land in the repository.

What this site is not

Not affiliated with any government body, party or contractor. The assessment page carries editorial judgements and says so plainly; each grade ships with the strongest argument against itself. The data underneath is separable from those judgements — you can reject every grade and still use every number.

current coverage

series
767
data points
15582
sources
52
charts
4460
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