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Bharat Tracker

assessment

How good is this, actually?

Every grade below is assigned against a global reference point, never against India's own past. That choice does most of the work here: almost every series on this site rises steeply from its 2001 base, and grading against that base would produce straight A's and tell you nothing.

Each verdict names the yardstick, states what is genuinely working, states what is genuinely not, and then gives the strongest good-faith argument against its own grade. If you disagree with a grade, the counterpoint is where to start.

1

frontier

6

above peers

4

as expected

3

constraint

A
At or near the global frontier — would be counted a strength in any large economy.
B
Clearly above its income-group peers, below the frontier. Real progress, real headroom.
C
Roughly where a country at this income level would be expected to sit. Neither achievement nor failure.
D
Below what this income level and this level of ambition should produce. A binding constraint.
C

Defence exports

Defence

measured against Global arms exporters. India's ~$2.8 bn is roughly 1-2% of world arms exports; the US, France and Russia each move an order of magnitude more.

what works

Growth is real and steep — a 34-fold rise in a decade, off an almost non-existent base, with private firms now the majority contributor and roughly 80 destination countries.

what does not

The absolute number is small, much of it is components and sub-assemblies feeding foreign primes rather than complete Indian platforms, and exports are still only about 15% of what India produces. India remains the world's second-largest arms *importer* while celebrating export records.

strongest objection to this grade

Base effects cut both ways: a country that exported ₹686 crore in 2013-14 was starting from nothing, and component exports are how every arms industry begins. Judged as a trajectory rather than a level, this is closer to a B.

Defence exports

high

Value of defence goods and services exported from India, as reported by the Ministry of Defence. Counts authorisations realised, not order book.

38.4k010k20k30k40k50kFY14FY18FY20FY22FY24FY26

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

Private sector share of defence exports

high

Share of defence export value originating from private firms rather than DPSUs.

020406080FY24FY25

Much of the private share is components and sub-assemblies feeding foreign primes, not finished platforms sold under an Indian badge.

C

Defence industrial base

Defence

measured against Self-reliance as practised by France, South Korea or Israel — countries that design, integrate and export complete platforms.

what works

Production has more than tripled since FY2014-15, the private share is rising, and Russian dependence in new procurement fell from 72% to 36% in a decade. Supplier diversification is a genuine structural achievement.

what does not

Production value counts output, not indigenous content — a platform assembled from imported kits counts in full. R&D spending at roughly 0.65% of GDP against China's ~2.4% is the binding constraint, and no amount of assembly capacity substitutes for it.

strongest objection to this grade

Tejas, BrahMos, the SSBN programme and the Agni series are real design-and-integration capabilities that most middle powers lack. The critique of 'assembly not design' understates what has actually been engineered.

Defence production

medium

Total value of defence items produced in India by DPSUs, other PSUs and private firms in a fiscal year.

050k100k150k200kFY15FY20FY21FY24FY25FY26

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

Private sector share of defence production

medium

Share of total defence production value contributed by private firms rather than DPSUs and other public undertakings.

0510152025FY24FY25

Direction of 'good' is genuinely contested: a higher private share signals a broader industrial base, but says nothing about whether the output is indigenous or competitively priced.

D

Defence budget composition

Defence

measured against Modernising militaries typically run capital expenditure at 30-40% of the defence budget. India sits near 26-27% and has not moved it in a decade.

what works

Capital outlay was fully utilised in FY2025-26 — historically, unspent modernisation money was a chronic embarrassment, and that has been fixed.

what does not

Pay and pensions crowd out equipment. Pensions alone are roughly a fifth of the budget and buy no capability. Headline budget growth of 175% since FY2014-15 substantially overstates capability growth once inflation and the revenue share are stripped out.

strongest objection to this grade

A large standing army on two contested land borders is a strategic choice, not an accounting failure. Personnel-heavy spending is what that posture costs, and comparisons with maritime powers are not like-for-like.

Ministry of Defence budget allocation

high

Total Union Budget allocation to the Ministry of Defence, including defence pensions and civil expenditure.

0200k400k600k800k1MFY15FY25FY26FY27

Includes pensions, which are roughly a fifth of the total and buy no new capability. Comparisons with China's or America's budgets that ignore this overstate India's usable defence spend.

Defence capital outlay

high

Budget line for capital acquisition and infrastructure — the portion that buys new equipment rather than paying salaries and pensions.

050k100k150k200kFY25FY26

This is the single most informative defence budget line: it is what actually modernises the force.

B

Highways and expressways

Infrastructure

measured against China built its ~180,000 km expressway network from a similar base two decades earlier. India's ~5,110 km of access-controlled corridors is roughly 3% of that.

what works

Access-controlled corridor length grew 55-fold from 93 km in 2014. Four-lane-plus highway length more than doubled. On freight-relevant capacity rather than raw kilometres, this is the strongest infrastructure story in the dataset.

what does not

Annual construction peaked at 13,327 km in FY2020-21 and has since plateaued near 10,000-12,000 km. Headline network length keeps rising partly because existing state highways are re-designated as national highways — growth on paper, not on the ground.

strongest objection to this grade

Land acquisition in a democracy with strong property litigation is genuinely slower than in China. Comparing build rates without comparing legal constraints flatters the comparator.

Access-controlled high-speed corridors and expressways

high

Length of access-controlled national high-speed corridors and expressways — the grade-separated, limited-access subset of the network.

02k4k6kMar 2014'25

This is the most genuinely impressive infrastructure series on the site: a 55-fold increase off a near-zero base in a decade.

National highways constructed per year

high

Kilometres of national highway completed during the fiscal year.

05k10k15kFY20FY21FY22FY23FY24FY25

The honest read: construction peaked at 13,327 km in FY2020-21 and has since plateaued around 10,000-12,000 km a year. The 'record pace' framing does not survive contact with this series.

B

Airports and regional connectivity

Infrastructure

measured against Airport count per capita and, more importantly, whether new capacity carries sustained traffic — the test UDAN was designed around.

what works

Operational airports more than doubled from 74 to over 160, with 93 aerodromes brought into service under UDAN and 663 routes started. Genuine geographic broadening of air access.

what does not

A material share of UDAN routes lapsed once the three-year viability-gap subsidy expired. Cumulative routes inaugurated is not the same as routes flying, and the headline is usually quoted as though it were. Several regional airports see minimal scheduled traffic.

strongest objection to this grade

Route churn is normal in regional aviation everywhere, and even discontinued routes leave behind a usable airstrip and terminal. The infrastructure outlives the subsidy.

Operational airports

medium

Count of airports and airstrips in India handling scheduled commercial passenger flights.

050100150200'14'24'25'26

Counts drift between releases (157, 159, 160, 163) because 'operational' sometimes includes heliports, water aerodromes and seasonally-served strips. Treat the trend as solid and any single year as ±5.

UDAN routes inaugurated

medium

Cumulative count of regional air routes started under the UDAN scheme.

0200400600800Oct 2025Feb 2026

Cumulative inaugurations, not currently-flying routes. A material share of UDAN routes have been discontinued after their three-year viability-gap subsidy expired — the scheme's central unresolved weakness.

sourceAll India Radio News (Prasar Bharati)verified 2026-08-17
B

Ports and maritime logistics

Infrastructure

measured against Vessel turnaround time against global port averages, and throughput against Chinese and Singaporean volumes.

what works

Turnaround time roughly halved to 48.84 hours, which now beats several developed-economy averages outright. Throughput hit a record 915 MT at major ports. This is a real operational win, not an announcement.

what does not

Turnaround improvement has stalled since FY2021-22 — four years to shave four hours, against a halving in the decade before. Capacity utilisation near 59% means further capacity spending has weak near-term returns. India's largest port still handles a fraction of Shanghai's volume.

strongest objection to this grade

Utilisation headroom is deliberate: ports built to just-in-time demand become bottlenecks the moment trade grows. Spare capacity is a feature when you expect to need it.

Average vessel turnaround time at major ports

medium

Mean time a vessel spends in port from arrival to departure.

0204060FY22FY26

Genuine operational gain, and one of the few Indian logistics metrics that now beats several developed-economy averages.

Cargo handled at major ports

high

Total cargo throughput at India's centrally-administered major ports in a fiscal year.

02004006008001kFY25FY26
B

Urban mass transit

Infrastructure

measured against China added roughly 10,000 km of metro in the same period India added 765 km. India is now third globally by network length.

what works

From 248 km in 5 cities to over 1,000 km in 23 cities. Crossing 1,000 km in October 2025 made India the third-largest metro network in the world.

what does not

Ridership grew 4x while network grew 4.1x — passengers per kilometre have been flat. Several systems run far below the projections used to justify their capital cost. Building track is not the same as moving people, and the financing of most systems assumes ridership that has not materialised.

strongest objection to this grade

Metro ridership typically matures over 10-15 years as feeder networks and land use catch up. Judging lines opened in the last five years on current ridership is premature.

Operational metro rail network

high

Total length of metro rail in revenue service across Indian cities.

02004006008001k1.2k'14'25

India passed 1,000 km in October 2025 to become the third-largest metro network in the world, behind China and the United States.

Daily metro rail ridership

medium

Average daily passenger journeys across all operational Indian metro systems.

051015'14'25

Ridership grew 4x while network length grew 4.1x — meaning average passengers per kilometre has been flat. New lines are not, on average, as well used as the old ones.

D

Defence industrial corridors

Defence

measured against Industrial cluster policy as executed in Shenzhen, or even Indian precedents like the software parks — measured on grounded investment and output, not MoUs.

what works

Two corridors are operating with land allotted and units producing. Eleven nodes across UP and Tamil Nadu give the policy real geographic anchoring.

what does not

Roughly ₹10,855 crore grounded against ~₹70,000 crore committed — about 15%. 170 MoUs converted into 57 land allotments. 13,000 jobs against a stated potential of 50,000. Every headline number quoted for these corridors is a commitment, and commitments are being reported as if they were construction.

strongest objection to this grade

Industrial corridors run on 15-20 year horizons and these are seven years old. Early-stage conversion rates of one-in-three on MoUs are not obviously bad by international standards.

Defence corridor investment committed

low

Investment committed via MoU to each defence industrial corridor.

42.1k32.7kUttar PradeshTamil Nadu010k20k30k40k50k

Committed is not grounded. Against roughly ₹70,000 crore of commitments across both corridors, grounded investment is about ₹10,855 crore — around 15%.

sourceIndian MastermindsSwarajyaverified 2026-08-17

Defence corridor investment grounded

low

Investment actually deployed on the ground in each defence industrial corridor.

4.4k6.4kUttar PradeshTamil Nadu02k4k6k8k

This is the number that matters, and the one rarely quoted. Grounded investment runs at roughly 15% of committed.

sourceIndian MastermindsSwarajyaverified 2026-08-17
D

Manufacturing

Manufacturing

measured against The government's own 25%-of-GDP target, and the 25-30% manufacturing shares that China, Korea and Vietnam used to industrialise.

what works

Absolute manufacturing output has grown substantially, and specific sectors — pharmaceuticals, automotive components, and more recently electronics assembly — are globally competitive.

what does not

Manufacturing's share of GDP has been essentially flat since 2001 and has never approached the 25% target, through two governments and a decade of Make in India. Merchandise exports grew 0.93% in FY2025-26. Over 40% of the workforce is still in agriculture. India industrialised out of order — services grew before factories did — and the factories have not caught up.

strongest objection to this grade

Services-led growth is not automatically inferior; it delivered India's fastest sustained growth and its largest export surplus. The premise that every economy must pass through a manufacturing phase is itself contestable.

Merchandise exports

high

Value of physical goods exported during the fiscal year.

0100200300400500FY25FY26

Effectively flat in FY2025-26. This is the clearest single sign that 'Make in India' has not yet converted into export competitiveness in goods.

Manufacturing value added

high

Manufacturing output net of intermediate inputs, as a share of GDP.

1305101520'01'05'09'13'17'21'25

The single most damaging number on this site: essentially flat since 2001 despite a decade of Make in India. The 25% target has never been approached.

sourceWorld Bankverified 2026-09-14
B

Trade and external sector

Trade

measured against Export growth and composition against Vietnam, which went from a fraction of India's exports to a competitive manufactured-goods exporter in the same period.

what works

Record $863 bn total exports. Services exports at $421 bn are a genuine global strength, with India a dominant supplier of IT and business services. Remittances are the world's largest.

what does not

Growth is almost entirely services-led — 8.71% for services against 0.93% for goods. Roughly half of services exports sit in one sector now directly exposed to AI automation of exactly that work. Concentration risk in the strongest part of the external account is the most under-discussed vulnerability here.

strongest objection to this grade

Services concentration is a strength being described as a weakness. India's IT sector has repeatedly absorbed technology shocks — offshoring, cloud, automation — and grown through each.

Services exports

high

Value of services exported during the fiscal year, including software, business and financial services.

0100200300400500FY25FY26

India's genuine global strength. Telecom/computer/information services alone were $206.6 bn — about 49% of services exports.

Merchandise exports

high

Value of physical goods exported during the fiscal year.

0100200300400500FY25FY26

Effectively flat in FY2025-26. This is the clearest single sign that 'Make in India' has not yet converted into export competitiveness in goods.

B

Space programme

Space

measured against Launch cadence and cost per kilogram against China (60+ orbital launches a year), the US, and commercial providers.

what works

Launch tempo roughly quadrupled. Cost-efficiency is genuinely world-leading — Chandrayaan-3 and Mangalyaan delivered results at a fraction of comparable mission budgets. A hundred missions and a working interplanetary capability.

what does not

Absolute cadence is an order of magnitude below China. Heavy dependence on PSLV is a single-point risk, underlined by third-stage failures on PSLV-C61 and PSLV-C62. Human spaceflight has slipped repeatedly.

strongest objection to this grade

Cost-per-outcome, not launch count, is the right metric for a programme with India's budget. On that measure ISRO outperforms nearly everyone.

ISRO launch cadence by era

medium

Average launch missions per year across two distinct eras of the Indian space programme.

024675–0910–26

A roughly 4x increase in launch tempo. Still an order of magnitude below China (60+ orbital launches a year) and SpaceX alone.

sourceFACTLY / Datafulverified 2026-08-17

ISRO launch missions, cumulative

medium

Cumulative count of ISRO launch vehicle missions flown since the SLV programme began in 1979.

1002025-01020406080100120

The 100th mission was reached in January 2025, 46 years after the first launch.

sourceThe FederalFACTLY / Datafulverified 2026-08-17
A

Electrification and basic services

Quality of life

measured against Universal access, the standard every development agency measures against.

what works

Electricity access moved from roughly 60% to effectively universal, and basic sanitation access rose faster than almost any comparable country has managed. On any honest reckoning these are the largest achievements in this dataset — they touched more lives than every defence and infrastructure line combined.

what does not

Access is not reliability: connection counts say nothing about hours of supply or voltage stability. Per-capita electricity consumption remains roughly a third of China's, which is the number that actually tracks industrialisation.

strongest objection to this grade

None worth making. This is the strongest part of the record and is routinely under-claimed relative to the infrastructure projects that photograph better.

Access to electricity

high

Share of population with access to electricity.

100020406080100120'01'04'07'10'13'16'19'22'24

From roughly 60% to near-universal. On any honest reckoning this is the single largest infrastructure achievement of the period.

sourceWorld Bankverified 2026-09-14

Access to basic sanitation

high

Share of population using at least basic sanitation services.

83020406080100'01'04'07'10'13'16'19'22'24

The steepest improvement of any social indicator here, concentrated in 2014-2019.

sourceWorld Bankverified 2026-09-14
C

Human capital and health

Quality of life

measured against Health spending, out-of-pocket burden and female labour participation against income-group peers.

what works

Infant and maternal mortality fell steeply. Life expectancy rose. Extreme poverty fell by hundreds of millions of people — the single most consequential number on this site.

what does not

Out-of-pocket health spending is among the highest in the world and medical costs remain a leading cause of household impoverishment. Female labour force participation is weak against every peer and is a direct drag on growth. Public health and education spending as a share of GDP remain low for the income level.

strongest objection to this grade

Poverty reduction at this scale is historically rare and arguably outweighs the composition critiques. A billion people got meaningfully richer.

Out-of-pocket health expenditure

high

Share of health spending paid directly by households.

44020406080100'01'04'07'10'13'16'19'23

Among the highest in the world. Medical costs remain a leading cause of household impoverishment in India.

sourceWorld Bankverified 2026-09-14

Female labour force participation

high

Share of women aged 15+ economically active (ILO estimate).

32010203040'01'05'09'13'17'21'25

One of India's weakest indicators against every peer — and a direct constraint on growth.

sourceWorld Bankverified 2026-09-14
C

Strategic forces

Defence

measured against A credible minimum deterrent with assured second strike, against China's ~600 warheads and expanding arsenal.

what works

A functioning triad — land, air and sea-based delivery — which few states possess. Canisterised systems and MIRV development indicate a maturing second-strike capability.

what does not

Estimated at ~180 warheads against China's ~600 and growing. Every figure here is an external estimate with a wide error bar — India publishes nothing — so confidence in this entire assessment is low by construction.

strongest objection to this grade

Minimum credible deterrence is a deliberate doctrine, not a shortfall. Warhead parity was never the goal, and grading against China's count imports a yardstick India explicitly rejected.

Estimated nuclear warhead inventory

low

Independent expert estimate of India's total nuclear warhead stockpile as of January each year.

1802025050100150200

India publishes nothing about its arsenal. Every figure here is an external estimate inferred from fissile-material production and delivery systems, with an error bar SIPRI itself describes as significant.

on these grades

These are editorial judgements, not computed scores — there is no defensible way to reduce “how good is India's defence industrial base” to arithmetic, and pretending otherwise would be the dishonest option. What is not editorial is the underlying data: every series cited here carries its source, its verification date and its confidence grade, and you can reach the primary document in two clicks from any chart. Disagree with the grade, but check the number first.