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Exports are around 15% of production value. India builds mainly for itself; the export story is real but small against the domestic order book.

Capital outlay sits near 26-27% of the budget. Revenue expenditure — pay and pensions — crowds out modernisation, and this ratio has barely moved in a decade.

Roughly 15% of committed corridor investment has been grounded. This single chart is the best corrective to announcement-driven infrastructure reporting.

Construction has plateaued around 10,000-12,000 km a year since the FY2020-21 peak, even as headline network length keeps rising.

The two lines track almost exactly — meaning passengers per kilometre have been flat. New metro lines are not, on average, better used than the ones they followed.

Utilisation is around 59%. There is real headroom for trade growth, and weak near-term returns on further capacity spending.

Services grew 8.71% in FY2025-26 while goods grew 0.93%. India's export engine is offices, not factories — the opposite of the manufacturing-led story usually told.

Route counts are cumulative inaugurations. A material share lapsed once the three-year viability-gap subsidy expired, so the operating network is smaller than the cumulative figure suggests.

Supplier diversification is the clearest structural win: Russia fell from 72% to 36% of Indian arms imports in a decade. India is nonetheless still the world's second-largest importer.

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

Direction of 'good' is genuinely contested: a higher private share signals a broader industrial base, but says nothing about whether the output is indigenous or competitively priced.

Direction of 'good' is genuinely contested: a higher private share signals a broader industrial base, but says nothing about whether the output is indigenous or competitively priced.

Much of the private share is components and sub-assemblies feeding foreign primes, not finished platforms sold under an Indian badge.

Much of the private share is components and sub-assemblies feeding foreign primes, not finished platforms sold under an Indian badge.