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SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one. Identification is made at the scene and is the most contested figure in any SATP sheet; read it as 'recorded as', not 'were'. The direction of good is left unset here for the same reason it is unset on every other side-of-conflict count on this site.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one. Identification is made at the scene and is the most contested figure in any SATP sheet; read it as 'recorded as', not 'were'. The direction of good is left unset here for the same reason it is unset on every other side-of-conflict count on this site.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one. Identification is made at the scene and is the most contested figure in any SATP sheet; read it as 'recorded as', not 'were'. The direction of good is left unset here for the same reason it is unset on every other side-of-conflict count on this site.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one. Incidents, not attacks: an attack in which nobody died does not appear, so this tracks lethality rather than the volume of violence.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one. Incidents, not attacks: an attack in which nobody died does not appear, so this tracks lethality rather than the volume of violence.

SATP's Punjab table begins in 2000, roughly a decade after the insurgency it belongs to had ended. The peak — the early and mid-1980s through 1993, with fatalities in the thousands each year — is on SATP's page only as a single 1981-2000 aggregate with no annual rows, so it is outside this series entirely. Read a flat line near zero as the aftermath of a conflict that was over, not as evidence there was never one. Incidents, not attacks: an attack in which nobody died does not appear, so this tracks lethality rather than the volume of violence.

Nominal rupees, so part of the fall since 2016 is inflation rather than price competition. TRAI's figure is an average realised rate across bundles rather than a tariff, and headline comparisons of India as 'cheapest in the world' usually cite a different basket.

Nominal rupees, so part of the fall since 2016 is inflation rather than price competition. TRAI's figure is an average realised rate across bundles rather than a tariff, and headline comparisons of India as 'cheapest in the world' usually cite a different basket.

Per data *user*, not per subscriber: people who own a phone but buy no data are outside the denominator, which lifts the average above what an ordinary reading of ‘per subscriber’ would give. The Survey publishes a much longer comparison elsewhere — 0.06 GB a month in 2014 against 25 GB in 2025 — but only as those two endpoints, so it is not spliced onto this series.

Per data *user*, not per subscriber: people who own a phone but buy no data are outside the denominator, which lifts the average above what an ordinary reading of ‘per subscriber’ would give. The Survey publishes a much longer comparison elsewhere — 0.06 GB a month in 2014 against 25 GB in 2025 — but only as those two endpoints, so it is not spliced onto this series.

Per data *user*, not per subscriber: people who own a phone but buy no data are outside the denominator, which lifts the average above what an ordinary reading of ‘per subscriber’ would give. The Survey publishes a much longer comparison elsewhere — 0.06 GB a month in 2014 against 25 GB in 2025 — but only as those two endpoints, so it is not spliced onto this series.

Per data *user*, not per subscriber: people who own a phone but buy no data are outside the denominator, which lifts the average above what an ordinary reading of ‘per subscriber’ would give. The Survey publishes a much longer comparison elsewhere — 0.06 GB a month in 2014 against 25 GB in 2025 — but only as those two endpoints, so it is not spliced onto this series.

Per data *user*, not per subscriber: people who own a phone but buy no data are outside the denominator, which lifts the average above what an ordinary reading of ‘per subscriber’ would give. The Survey publishes a much longer comparison elsewhere — 0.06 GB a month in 2014 against 25 GB in 2025 — but only as those two endpoints, so it is not spliced onto this series.

Per data *user*, not per subscriber: people who own a phone but buy no data are outside the denominator, which lifts the average above what an ordinary reading of ‘per subscriber’ would give. The Survey publishes a much longer comparison elsewhere — 0.06 GB a month in 2014 against 25 GB in 2025 — but only as those two endpoints, so it is not spliced onto this series.

VAHAN excludes Telangana and Lakshadweep, which do not report to it, so the national figure is a slight undercount. Two- and three-wheelers dominate the count; reading it as a car number overstates the passenger-vehicle transition by an order of magnitude.

VAHAN excludes Telangana and Lakshadweep, which do not report to it, so the national figure is a slight undercount. Two- and three-wheelers dominate the count; reading it as a car number overstates the passenger-vehicle transition by an order of magnitude.

VAHAN excludes Telangana and Lakshadweep, which do not report to it, so the national figure is a slight undercount. Two- and three-wheelers dominate the count; reading it as a car number overstates the passenger-vehicle transition by an order of magnitude.

VAHAN excludes Telangana and Lakshadweep, which do not report to it, so the national figure is a slight undercount. Two- and three-wheelers dominate the count; reading it as a car number overstates the passenger-vehicle transition by an order of magnitude.

VAHAN excludes Telangana and Lakshadweep, which do not report to it, so the national figure is a slight undercount. Two- and three-wheelers dominate the count; reading it as a car number overstates the passenger-vehicle transition by an order of magnitude.

VAHAN excludes Telangana and Lakshadweep, which do not report to it, so the national figure is a slight undercount. Two- and three-wheelers dominate the count; reading it as a car number overstates the passenger-vehicle transition by an order of magnitude.

Passengers handled at domestic terminals. The sheet also lists April-to-October part-years for FY24 and FY25; both are excluded, and the FY24 part-year in particular would otherwise contradict the full FY24 row directly above it.