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Exports are around 15% of production value. India builds mainly for itself; the export story is real but small against the domestic order book.

Capital outlay sits near 26-27% of the budget. Revenue expenditure — pay and pensions — crowds out modernisation, and this ratio has barely moved in a decade.

Roughly 15% of committed corridor investment has been grounded. This single chart is the best corrective to announcement-driven infrastructure reporting.

Construction has plateaued around 10,000-12,000 km a year since the FY2020-21 peak, even as headline network length keeps rising.

Utilisation is around 59%. There is real headroom for trade growth, and weak near-term returns on further capacity spending.

Services grew 8.71% in FY2025-26 while goods grew 0.93%. India's export engine is offices, not factories — the opposite of the manufacturing-led story usually told.

Route counts are cumulative inaugurations. A material share lapsed once the three-year viability-gap subsidy expired, so the operating network is smaller than the cumulative figure suggests.

Supplier diversification is the clearest structural win: Russia fell from 72% to 36% of Indian arms imports in a decade. India is nonetheless still the world's second-largest importer.

Nominal rupees, not inflation-adjusted. Roughly a third of the 2013-14 to 2025-26 growth is rupee inflation and depreciation.

FY2024-25 was first announced as ₹1,50,590 crore and later restated to ~₹1.54 lakh crore once remaining private-sector returns were counted. The revised figure is shown and flagged.

Direction of 'good' is genuinely contested: a higher private share signals a broader industrial base, but says nothing about whether the output is indigenous or competitively priced.

Much of the private share is components and sub-assemblies feeding foreign primes, not finished platforms sold under an Indian badge.

An authorisation is a permission to export, not a completed sale. Counts breadth of exporter participation rather than value.

Includes pensions, which are roughly a fifth of the total and buy no new capability. Comparisons with China's or America's budgets that ignore this overstate India's usable defence spend.

This is the single most informative defence budget line: it is what actually modernises the force.

India publishes nothing about its arsenal. Every figure here is an external estimate inferred from fissile-material production and delivery systems, with an error bar SIPRI itself describes as significant.

India publishes nothing about its arsenal. Every figure here is an external estimate inferred from fissile-material production and delivery systems, with an error bar SIPRI itself describes as significant.

SIPRI's trend-indicator value measures military capability transferred, not money paid. It is not comparable to customs data.

The halving of Russian dependence since 2010-14 is one of the clearest structural shifts in Indian defence procurement.

Committed is not grounded. Against roughly ₹70,000 crore of commitments across both corridors, grounded investment is about ₹10,855 crore — around 15%.

This is the number that matters, and the one rarely quoted. Grounded investment runs at roughly 15% of committed.

Two corridors (UP, Tamil Nadu) are operating with land allotted and units producing. Two more (Maharashtra, Assam) are announced but not established.

Node lists are press-sourced. They are stable and uncontested, but no primary notification was located during verification, so this is graded low rather than treated as a record.

Reported against a stated potential of 50,000 jobs — actual delivery is around a quarter of that.